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Service of Process Upon a Corporation
of action arises out of, and is based on, the same alleged negligent act that
caused the injury to the minor. The majority rule would say that the
parent has an independent cause of action which is true in some respects.
However, upon what will the parent base his action where in a prior suit
the defendant has been found to be free from negligence? Should the
courts ignore the fact that the defendant has been found to have com-
mitted no tort against the minor and continue to state "different parties,
different causes of action"? Through common sense and necessity a logi-
cal and more practical view would be that the parent's right is derivative
and secondary. Hence, the parent's rights should be conditioned on the
minor's right of recovery.
The decision in the Videtto case is undoubtedly the Ohio rule and
represents the prevailing rule throughout the United States. In all
probability the Ohio courts will continue to follow this rule notwith-
standing a well reasoned minority view. However, it is suggesed that
Ohio should re-examine the problem closely.
WILLIAM A. PAPENBROCK
CIVIL PROCEDURE - SERVICE OF PROCESS UPON A CORPORATION
Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc.
172 Ohio St. 402, 176 N.E.2d 410 (1961)
It is well established that a corporation cannot avoid service of process
by the absence of those officers and employees who are designated by
statute as the proper recipients of such service.1 Ohio Revised Code
section 2703.10 provides for service of summons, in the absence of the
therein named officers and employees, upon the person having charge
of the office or usual place of business of the defendant corporation.
Recently the Supreme Court of Ohio broadened the interpretation of
that statute by permitting service of summons on one not in fact an
employee of the defendant corporation being served.2
In Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc.3 the Court of Appeals for Cuya-
hoga County affirmed the trial court's decision granting a motion to quash
service of summons on the defendant corporation. However, on appeal
this decision was reversed by a unanimous supreme court.
1. Fee v. Big Sand Iron Co., 13 Ohio St. 563 (1862); Sunday Creek Coal Co. v. West, 47
Ohio App. 537, 192 N.E. 284 (1933); Tioga Coal Corp. v. Silnan, 125 W. Va. 58,22 S.E.2d
873 (1942).
2. Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc., 172 Ohio St. 402, 176 N.E.2d 410 (1961). See also
discussion in Civil Procedure section p. 440 supra, and in Corporations, Partnerships, and
Associations section, p. 453 supra.
3. Ibid.
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Defendant corporation's motion to quash service was based on the
allegation that in serving the summons the sheriff had failed to comply
with the statutory requisites.4 To sustain that allegation defendant
argued that both the chief and subordinate officers of defendant corpora-
tion were available in the county for service and could have been found upon
reasonable inquiry, and that the person served was neither an employee
of defendant corporation nor in charge of its office.'
The supreme court was confronted with a situation wherein sum-
mons had been served upon a non-employee in the office of the defendant
corporation, who had in turn notified the subordinate officers of that
corporation of the summons prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions. Thus, the defendant corporation had been given an opportunity to
defend in the proceedings against it.
Because there had been no prior judicial determination of who
constitutes "the person having charge thereof," the court was free to
provide a definition. It seized upon the fact that the statute does not
require that such person be either an officer or employee of the corpora-
tion being served. The result was an interpretation of "the person having
charge thereof" to mean the superior of the persons in the office of the
defendant corporation at the time of service, whether or not such person
be an employee or officer of that corporation.6
The fundamental purpose of service statutes is to provide that notice
which will be most likely to result in actual notice to the defendant
corporation of the proceedings against it.7 It seems likely that a person
not in the employ of a corporation would not utilize sufficient effort to
call such summons to the attention of the corporation. On the other
hand, an employee or person left in charge of a corporation's office would
4. Ohio Revised Code section 2703.10 provides: "A summons against a corporation may
be served upon [1] the president, mayor, chairman or president of the board of directors or
trustees, or other chief officer; or [2) if its chief officer is not found in the county, upon its
cashier, treasurer, secretary, clerk, or managing agent; or [3] if none of such officers can befound, by a copy left at the office or usual place of business of the corporation with the person
having charge thereof ... ." (Emphasis added.).
5. Record, p. 6-9, Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc., 172 Ohio St. 402, 176 NXE.2d 410
(1961). The affidavits of the corporate officers and that of the non-employee, who was
served with the summons, establish that the person served was an employee of a real estate
management agency which was under contract to manage the affairs of defendant corporation.
The affidavits also show that the agency and defendant corporation occupy space in the same
suite of offices.
6. Moriarty v. Westgate Center, Inc., 172 Ohio St. 402, 407, 176 N.E.2d 410, 413 (1961).
The court made no effort to define further the term "superior."
7. Abraham v. Akron Sausage Co., 23 Ohio App. 224, 155 N.E. 254 (1926). One authority
states: "The fundamental object of all laws relating to the service of process is to give that
notice which will in the nature of things most likely bring the attention of the corporation to
the commencement of the proceedings against it, and when the legislature carries out this
design its provisions should not be stricken down by the courts." 42 AM. JUr. Process § 107
(1942). The court in the Moriarty case quoted with approval the portion of this statement
preceding the comma, but neither quoted nor commented on the latter portion of the state-
ment. 172 Ohio St. 402, 407, 176 N.E.2d 410, 413 (1961).
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be more likely to bring such matters to the attention of the chief or
subordinate officers of the corporation. Although the non-employee in
the Moriarty case brought the summons to the attention of the defendant
corporation, it cannot be assumed that every non-employee would do
the same. For this reason it would seem that the judicial interpretation
of section 2703.10 in the Moriarty case would place an undue burden on
the defendant corporation by requiring it to depend upon a person not
in its employ to notify its officers of the summons. In the light of the
purpose of service statutes, the interpretation by the Moriarty court should
be limited to the factual situation in that case.
In attempting to provide a means by which both service on and
notice to a corporation could be effected, the Ohio General Assembly
provided for three alternate methods of service 8 It recognized that
service pursuant to the first (upon the chief officer) and second (upon
the subordinate officers) would be more likely to provide the corporation
with actual notice, and, therefore, subjected the third method (upon
the person in charge) to a condition precedent. Previous courts have
held that the third method must be strictly construed and can be utilized
only after the sheriff has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the where-
abouts of each of the persons included in the other two categories.
Although the court in the Moriarty case found that the statute had
been complied with in regard to the person served on behalf of the
corporation, it was confronted with the fact that the sheriff had made no
effort to find the chief or subordinate officers of defendant corporation.
The supreme court recognized that the failure to comply with such a
condition precedent should have the effect of invalidating the service of
summons on a corporation. However, it seemed to limit such recognition
to the case wherein there was a question of fact as to whether the atten-
tion of the defendant corporation was promptly brought to the commence-
ment of proceedings against it. Without further discussion, it held that
where actual notice of the summons is received by the corporation, the
fact that the sheriff has not made a reasonable effort to find the chief
or subordinate officers of that corporation prior to serving the summons
8. OHIO REV. CODE § 2703.10. See note 4 supra.
9. In Sunday Creek Coal Company v. West, 47 Ohio App. 537, 192 N.E. 284 (1933), the
court held that when the sheriff made no attempt to locate the company's officers, his leaving
a copy of the summons with the payroll clerk did not constitute effective service. In Abraham
v. Akron Sausage Company, 23 Ohio App. 224, 155 N.E. 254 (1926), the court held that a
sheriff may serve summons on a subordinate officer of a corporation before he finds the chief
officers of the corporation. Though the case was decided under the second (service on a
subordinate officer) method, the court noted that service by the third method is conditioned
by the mandatory verb can, while the second method is not so conditioned. This case was
tried under Ohio General Code section 11288, the immediate predecessor of Ohio Revised
Code section 2703.10. In the latter statute the mandatory verb can still conditions the
use of the third method of service. The court in the Moriarty case either overlooked or dis-
regarded this fact.
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